

Securities And Futures Commission

AML/CTF Webinar 2025

Suspicious Transaction Reports, Introduction of STREAMS 2, Common Typologies and Case Sharing

Presented by:

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Agenda of FIIB's Sharing



01. About FIIB & JFIU





Expansion of FID and JFIU



Features of JFIU



Co-staffed by HKPF and **C&ED** and based in Police **Headquarters**



Sole Agency in HK


Managing Suspicious Transaction Reporting Regime



Financial Intelligence Exchange with LEAs and FIUs worldwide


01. About FIIB & JFIU

Functions of the JFIU



Public-Private Partnership







Cap. 405

Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance 販毒(追討得益)條例

Cap. 455
Organized and Serious Crimes
Ordinance
有組織及嚴重罪行條例

Cap. 575

United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Mesaures) Ordinance 聯合國(反恐怖主義措施)條例

Cap. 615

AML &CFT Ordinance and Amendment 打擊洗錢及恐怖分子資金籌集 (金融機構)條例及其修訂



Anti-Money Laundering (AML)

(s.25 of Cap. 405 - DTROP and s.25 of Cap. 455 - OSCO)

Any person

- Knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe
- Any property
- In whole or in part directly or indirectly represents proceeds of drug trafficking / indicatable offence
- Deals with that property

任何人

- 知道或有合理理由相信,
- 任何財產
- 全部或部分、直接或間接代表任何人的販毒/從可公訴罪行得益
- 而仍處理該財產
- 即屬犯罪



FINE OF HKD 5 MILLIONS & 14 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT

Counter Financing of Terrorism (CFT)

(s.7 of Cap. 575 - UNATMO)

Any person

- Provide or collect by any means directly or indirectly
- Any property
- (1) With the intention that the property be used or (2) knowing that the property will be used
- In whole or in part to commit one or more terrorist acts

任何人

- 不得在下述情況以任何方法直接或間接提供 或籌集財產:
- (1) 懷有將該財產的全部或部分用於作出一項 或多於一項恐怖主義行為的意圖(不論該財產 實際上有否被如此使用);或
- (2) 知道該財產的全部或部分將會用於作出一項/多於一項恐怖主義行為(不論該財產實際上 有否被如此使用)

MAXIMUM PENALTY



FINE & 14 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT

Suspicious Transactions Reporting

(s.25A(1) of Cap. 405 - DTROP; s.25A(1) of Cap. 455 - OSCO; and s12(1) of Cap. 575 - UNATMO)

Any person

- Knows or suspects any property
- (1) represents / was used / is intended to be used in connection with the proceeds of drug trafficking / indictable offences or
- (2) is terrorist property
- Should disclose that knowledge or suspicion to an authorized officer (i.e. JFIU)

任何人

- 知道或懷疑任何財產
- (1)全部或部分、直接或間接代表任何人的販毒/從可公 訴罪行得益曾在與販毒/可公訴罪行有關的情況下使用 ;或擬在與販毒/可公訴罪行有關的情況下使用;或
- (2) 是恐怖分子財產;
- 該人須在合理範圍內盡快把該知悉或懷疑, 連同上述知 悉或懷疑所根據的任何事宜, 向獲授權人披露 (i.e. JFIU)

MAXIMUM PENALTY

FINE OF HKD 50,000 & 3 MONTHS' IMPRISONMENT



TIPPING OFF

(s.25A(5) of Cap. 405 - DTROP; s.25A(5) of Cap. 455 - OSCO; and s12(5) of Cap. 575 - UNATMO)

Where a person

- Knows or suspects a disclosure has been made
- The person shall not disclose to another person any matter
- Which is likely to prejudice any investigation which might be conducted following that first-mentioned disclosure

任何人如知道或懷疑已有任何披露根據第(1)或(4)款作出,而仍向其他人披露任何相當可能損害或者會為跟進首述披露而進行的調查的事宜,

即屬犯罪。


MAXIMUM PENALTY

FINE OF HKD 500,000 & 3 YEARS' IMPRISONMENT



03. STR Reporting Regime

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03. STR Reporting Regime

Why should you report STRs?











What's more?



Guideline on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (For Licensed Corporations and SFC-licensed Virtual Asset Service Providers)

June 2023

Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Guideline issued by the Securities and Futures Commission for Associated Entities of Licensed Corporations and SFC-licensed Virtual Asset Service Providers

June 2023

SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION 世秀及期資事務監察委員會

打擊洗錢及恐怖分子資金籌集指引 (適用於持牌法區 及獲證監會發牌的虛擬資產服務提供者)

2023年6月

證券及期貨事務監察委員會發出適用於持牌法團及 獲證監會發牌的虛擬資產服務提供者的有聯繫實體的 防止洗錢及恐怖分子資金籌集的指引

Content

2023年6月

https://www.sfc.hk/en/Rules-and-standards/Codes-and-guidelines



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What's more?

Money laundering reporting officer					
7.9	An FI should appoint an MLRO as a central				
1.9					
	reference point for reporting suspicious transactions				
	and also as the main point of contact with the JFIU				
	and law enforcement agencies. The MLRO should				
	play an active role in the identification and reporting				
	of suspicious transactions. Principal functions of the				
	MLRO should include having oversight of:				
	In a continuation of the c				
	(a) review of internal disclosures and exception reports and, in light of all available relevant				
	reports and, in light of all available relevant				

Internal reporting	
	An FI should establish and maintain clear policies and procedures to ensure that:
	(a) all staff are made aware of the identity of the MLRO and of the procedures to follow when making an internal report; and(b) all internal reports must reach the MLRO without undue delay.


Reporting to the JFIU			
7.20	If after completing the review of the internal report, the MLRO decides that there are grounds for knowledge or suspicion, he should disclose the information to the JFIU as soon as it is reasonable to do so after his evaluation is complete together with the information on which that knowledge or suspicion is based.		
	Dependent on when knowledge or suspicion arises, an STR may be made either before a suspicious transaction or activity occurs (whether the intended transaction ultimately takes place or not), or after a transaction or activity has been completed.		






STR Statistics

- from 2017 to September 2025







STR Statistics




- from 2017 to Sept 2025



STRs filed by Securities Firms & VATPs between 2017 - Sept 2025



Current STR Reporting Methods - by email and e-submission (STREAMS)



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Suspected Crimes (Suspicious Indicato	ors) Open S	Source Info.	Entity Lists)	Check Save F	rin	
SECTION 12 C	TRAFFICKIN ORGANIZE	G (RECOVE D AND SEE D NATIONS	ERY OF PR RIOUS CRI (ANTI-TER	MES ORDÍN RRORISM M	ORDINA IANCE EASUI	/ RES) ORDINANCE		
STR Summary								
STR Number:								
Submission Number:								
Date of Submission:								
Acknowledgement Issue	Date:							
Consent Letter Issue Da	te:							
Consent:		✓None	O Yes	O No	0 1	Not Applicable		
Consent Remark:								
Special Cases with Tim	e Critical Nature:	:						
* Report Related to Existing Investigation:		O Yes	No					
Attachment:						+ Refresh		
No.		File Name				File Size		
						КВ		
				ıtal		КВ		

04. INTRODUCTION OF STREAMS 2







Enhanced Data Collection in STREAMS 2

Comprehensive scope of information collected

Facilitate big data analytics to identify network / trends effectively



Social Media

Capture relevant social media identifiers and activity



Digital Footprints

Collect IP, SSID, BSSID, Geohash Data, etc.



Address Format

Standardised address input



Cryptotransactions

Dedicated fields for cryptotransactions



Benefits of E-submission


Free and secure system

Instant Acknowledgement

Negate the need of paperbased reporting

Receive consent decision via STREAMS

Total submission of STRs in 2024: 147,660







Mode of STR Submission in STREAMS 2



PDF Form Structured PDF for offline completion and secure upload

Web Form User-friendly online forms with built-in validation

XML

Direct system-to-system reporting



STR Form Enhancement in STREAMS 2

Comprehensive Data Fields

Mandatory Fields

- Core information required for all sectors
- The fields will be remarked by a (*)

Optional Fields (Sector Specific)

 Additional data points tailored to specific industry needs and transaction types

É, FIB




STR Form Enhancement in STREAMS 2

Optional Fields (Sector Specific)

 Additional data points tailored to specific industry needs and transaction types

Example:



05. STR Reporting In STREAMS 2



How to identify suspicion?

<u>SAFE</u> approach

SCREEN

- Screen the account for suspicious indicators
- Adverse news, sensitive connections, method of payment etc






- Check and enquiry
- Clarify any suspicion, such as financial background, source of fund, purpose of transactions etc

FIND

- Find and review clients' previous records
- Analysis on clients' backgrounds





EVALUATE

- Evaluate the available information to determine if the transaction is suspicious
- If affirmative, file STRs



Red Flag Indicators (Securities Firms)

Clients

- Received LEA enquiries/ stop payment
- Politically Exposed Person (PEP)?
- Person / Corporate from high-risk country?
- No known nexus in HK / Adverse news
- Suspected forged document during applications?
- Virtual on-boarding video injection, replay attacks or presentation attacks to bypass facial recognition systems

Transactions

- Funds from 3rd part(ies) / by cash / cashier order?
- Transactions incommensurate with client's background?
- Drastic change of transaction behaviour and frequent transactions within a short period of time
- Consolidate funds from multiple persons before sending onward to brokerage house
- Transfer funds out of account rapidly without executing any trading activity



Red Flag Indicators (VATPs)

Wallet Holders

- LEA's enquiry / stop payment request
- PEP
- Person or Corporate from highrisk country
- Has no known nexus in Hong Kong / has adverse news
- Suspected using forged document

Transactions

- Wallet used as temporary repository of funds
- Transactions incommensurate with client's background
- Transactions with unrelated parties / high-risk jurisdiction / sanction entity

Red Flag Indicators (Securities Firms & VATPs)

Digital Footprints

- Indexed device IDs or IP addresses commonly appeared and became abusive in several wallets
- Multiple wallets shared common device IDs / IP addresses
- Sudden change of device and geolocation
- Wallet holder claimed to be residing in foreign country but with IP address in HK





Red Flag Indicators (Securities Firms & VATPs)


Further Enquiry

- Background check / open source research unveil adverse news / records
- Unwilling to respond to questions or answers are not convincing
- Unwilling to provide supporting documents

Evaluation


- Information from client is incommensurate with the record in hand
- Information from client could not be verified





























STR triggered by LEA enquiry / intelligence




Disclosure-related Laws


- Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance [Cap.405]
- Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance [Cap.455]
- United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance [Cap.575]
- Hong Kong National Security Law

Other Information:

Report related to previous / other disclosure












Reporting Party

Subject

Organisation




 Identification no., age, nationality, residential address, occupation, reported salary, source of wealth, etc.

Account

Transaction


• Specify the roles of the reported entities (suspect, victim, transaction counterparty, etc.)



Suspected Crimes

Suspicious Indicator







- Unique identification no., date/place of incorporation, business nature
- Details of connected parties (e.g. directors, shareholders and beneficial owners)







Reportin	g Party	Subject	Organisation	Account	Transaction	Suspected Cr	imes Sus	picious Indicato	r		
+ Add	Account	Create	Crypto-transaction-related Yes No	OTC-Related Yes No						⊘ Cance	el Confirm
	Name of Institu	tion		If Oth ▼	ners			Account No. (no bank	k code required)*		_
7	Type *			If Oth ▼	ners			Customer ID			_
	Opening Date yyyy-mm-dd				ing Date -mm-dd		Ġ	1			
	Account Bala	nce Add								Total Nu	ımber of Records: 0
	Currency		Balance	Date	of The Account Balance	No Doto		Equivalent Value in	1 HKD	A	ction
						No Data					
	Digital Footp	rint New	Link Existing Digital Footprin	nt						Total N	umber of Records:0
	Event Type	Device	e Name Device Mo	odel Device OS	IP Address	Period From	Period To	SSID BSSID	Geohash Lati	itude Longitude	Action
						No Data					
	Related Com	pany Link Ex	isting Company							Total Nu	ımber of Records: 0
	Company Nan	ne (English)		Company Name (Chinese)		BR No.	CR No.	Role	Relationship	p
						No Data					
	Related Pers	on Link Exist	ing Person							Total Nu	ımber of Records: 0
	Family Name	Giver	Name Middle Nam	ne Chinese Name	Date of Birth	Gender HK	O Other ID Typ	e if Others O	ther ID No. Issuing Country / F	Place Role	Relationship
						No Data					


























































Type '



<	Reporting Party	Subject	Organisation	Account	Transaction	Suspected Crimes	Suspicious Indicator
	spected Crimes Pleas east one item must be se			s)			
<u>Nati</u>	ional Security					Illic	sit Trade Activities
	Offence(s) Endangerin	g National Secu	urity				Counterfeiting and Piracy of Products
Fra	<u>ud</u>						Dealing in Precious Metals and Stones without a license
	Email Scam						Endangered Species Smuggling
	Investment Scam						
	Romance Scam						Illicit Cigarettes
	Telephone Deception						Smuggling (including those related to customs and excise duties and taxes)
	Others (Please Specify)					Trade Based Money Laundering
							Unlicensed Money Service Operator (UMSO)
<u>Oth</u>	er Crimes						
	Bookmaking						Kidnapping, Illegal Restraint and Hostage-Taking
	Crime under Gambling	Ordinance					Money Laundering
	Corruption and Bribery						Murder, Grievous Bodily Injury
	Counterfeiting Currence	у					Participation in an Organized Criminal Group and Racketeering



Reporting Party Subject Organisation Account Transaction Suspected Crime	Suspicious Indicator			
Please put a " ✓ " in the selected box(es).				
Fund Movement Pattern	Accounts			
☐ Indirect Transaction / Transaction Intended to Break Audit Trail	Account Operated / Controlled by Third-Party Other Than Signatory / Account Holder			
☐ Large Cash Transaction	Non Resident Personal Account			
Numerous Transaction Counterparties without Apparent Reasonable Cause	Offshore Account (e.g. BVI Bank Account)			
☐ Temporary Repository of Fund	Shell Company Account			
☐ Transactions Involving High-Risk Jurisdiction / Region	□ N/A			
Uneconomical Transaction / Transaction with No Business Purpose	National Security Related			
□ N/A	A person is suspected of committing an offence endangering national security			
Customer Background / Behaviour	☐ Transactions with specified absconders under Safeguarding National Security Ordinance			
Civil Servant-related	Transactions with prohibited organisations under Safeguarding National Security Ordinance			
Common IP Address	☐ Transactions with high NS risk counterparties			
Customer Evasive / Reluctant to Provide Information	Others (Please Specify)			
Customer Insisted to Use Less Secured Transaction Methods	□ N/A			
Politically Exposed Persons (PEP)	Other Suspicious Indicator			
Sanctions-related	Casino-related Suspicious Transaction			
Shared Device NEW	Charitable Organisation / NPO-related Suspicious Transaction			
	Others (Please Specify)			
Suspected Counterfeit Document Presented by the Customers	□ N/A			
Suspected Money Courier / Unlicensed Money Service Operator				





Narrative Comment about the Suspicious Transactions
1. Triggering Factors
Commission / Types / Association of Offence
Evidence of Suspicious Transaction Patterns
☐ Intelligence Received from LEAs
Material from Publicly Available Information (e.g. adverse news, SFC alerts)
Receipt of Search Warrant / Court Order
Upstream Scam Intervention
2. Background of Person / Organisation
3. Details of Investigation / Transaction Analysis
4. Conclusions / Action Taken / Way Forward

Suspicious Indicator Suspected Crimes Reporting Party Subject Transaction Offence (Fraud, Corruption, Sanction, Terrorist Financing, National Security, etc.) Suspicious Transaction Patterns (Substantial Cash Deposits, Temporary Repository of Funds, etc.) Intelligence / Enquiry from LEAs (e.g. JFIU, CSTCB, ADCC) Publicly available information (Adverse News, SFC Press Release, Sanction, etc.) Receipt of Search Warrant / Court Order Upstream Scam Intervention (Client is a victim)



Narrative Comment about the Suspicious Transactions 1. Triggering Factors Commission / Types / Association of Offence Evidence of Suspicious Transaction Patterns Intelligence Received from LEAs Material from Publicly Available Information (e.g. adverse news, SFC alerts) Receipt of Search Warrant / Court Order ☐ Upstream Scam Intervention 2. Background of Person / Organisation Details of Investigation / Transaction Analysis 4. Conclusions / Action Taken / Way Forward

Reporting Party Subject Organisation Account Transaction Suspected Crimes Suspicious Indicator

- Nationality
- Type of ID document HKID Holder, China Passport Holder, etc.
- Occupation / business nature, source of wealth, source of income
- Family / business background, if known e.g. opening accounts together (Ms. CHAN Xxx, HKID No.) or related entity also maintained business relationship with the institution and displayed similar suspicion
- Date of commencing business relationship with the client





Narrative Comment about the Suspicious Transactions
1. Triggering Factors
Commission / Types / Association of Offence
Evidence of Suspicious Transaction Patterns
☐ Intelligence Received from LEAs
Material from Publicly Available Information (e.g. adverse news, SFC alerts)
Receipt of Search Warrant / Court Order
Upstream Scam Intervention
2. Background of Person / Organisation
3. Details of Investigation / Transaction Analysis
4. Conclusions / Action Taken / Way Forward

Suspected Crimes Suspicious Indicator Reporting Party Subject Review Period • Transactions and linkage with suspicious counterparts / third party, if any • KYC / RFI result Open source information / details of the adverse news / sanction list with website links • Findings on the digital footprints, if any

- Further review
- Exit relationship




05. STR Reporting in STREAMS 2 - Appropriate File Attachments














Suspicious Indicator

Our Observations

On STRs received from reporting entities

common pitfalls



STR contains a group of **unrelated** subjects / did not specify their commonality in the narrative part

- If there is no correlation among the subjects, report STR separately for each subject;
- If syndication is observed, specify the commonality in the narrative part

Only mention "refer to Attachment" in the narrative part of the STR

- Narrative comment should be included in STR Form.
- Only transactions or supporting documents be provided in form of attachment

Report STR **solely** because other companies of the same group report STRs of the subject

 Compliance officers should critically review if the accounts of the same subject were used to channel illicit funds / related to terrorist financing





Feedback from JFIU

Acknowledgement of Receipt

Consent / No Consent / Not Applicable

Quarterly STR Analysis published by JFIU

Meetings with stakeholders





Upcoming Arrangement for STREAMS 2



Final UAT

- STR Submission
- Check STR status including consent decision
- Receive LNC and Notification Letters from Police



Seminar to different sectors

Starting from October / November 2025



Enquiry Hotline (General)

- Senior Inspector Owen TSE
- Tel: 3660 0533 / Email: owencytse@police.gov.hk



Enquiry Hotline (Technical)

- System Analyst Mr. Christopher CHAN
 - Tel: 3660 9682 / Email: christopherchan@police.gov.hk





TIMELINE OF LAUNCHING

STREAMS 2

Sept 2025

Deadline of submitting email address for STREAMS 2 login during UAT



01



Oct-Nov 2025

Final UAT for reporting entity

Oct-Nov 2025

Seminars for industries practitioners



Jan 2026 (Tentatively)

Launch of STREAMS 2



04

Dec 2025 – Jan 2026

Arrange account opening of STREAMS 2





05



06. Common Typologies & Case Sharing







#1 Typology involving the laundering of proceeds of fraud through brokerage houses




Money mule received proceeds of fraud from victims, who were instructed to send funds to the money mule's account in Bank A (first layer account)



Money mule held an investment account at a brokerage house and sent the funds onward to a brokerage house account (second layer account)



Funds were then withdrawn from the brokerage house into an account held in another bank ("Bank B") under the same person



*Transfer the money out of brokerage house account rapidly without executing any trading activity





#1 Typology involving the laundering of proceeds of fraud through brokerage houses



money mule



Money mule brokerage ho

Funds were t house into an

Counter-measures?

- Red flag indicators
- Funds from self-named accounts may also be illicit
- Abnormal trading pattern large funds in/out with no trading activity
 - Amount of Account Turnover vs Financial Background
- Inward and outward funds can only transact with the same account
 - Filing STRs
 - Step up monitoring strategies

Licenced Brokerage House

★Transfer the money out of brokerage house account rapidly without executing any trading activity



#2 Identity Fabrication during Remote On-boarding



Used stolen / lost HKIDs



Videos / photos generated by deepfake technology



To circumvent facial recognition authentication measures







#2 Identity Fabrication during Remote On-boarding



Jsec

Counter-measures?



- Pre-Verification Environment & Metadata Collection
 - Al-Generated Content Detection
- Enhanced Authentication Protocols Multi-factor authentication
 - Cross-Referencing & Continuous Monitoring

umvent facial cognition nentication neasures

te



#3 Insider Dealings (1)



The purchase of Company Y's stocks exceeded 50% of the daily turnover



Country Z Stock Exchange

Mr. X

Consolidation plan was announced on the same day after the market closed. The stock price increases 70% within two weeks




Company Y







#3 Insider Dealings (1)





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- Unusual large-volume trading
- The purchasing behavior does not match with client's investment portfolio – Mr. X never trade stocks listed in Country Z's stock exchange
- Trading took place around the same time when market-sensitive information was announced

untry Z Stock change



price increases 70% within two weeks

Company




#4 Insider Dealings (2)



First occasion for purchase of Company A's stock










Mr. X

Selling of Company A's stock after the favorable announcement







Company A








#4 Insider Dealings (2)

Pirst occasion for purchase of Company A's stock



Suspicious Activity Indicators

- Funds from third party
- Mr. Y had close connection with Company A, he might have obtained insider information
- First occasion of purchasing Company A's stock
 - The purchase is shortly before the favorable announcement

Company /

senior position at Company A



Stock Marke

Company A





#5 Market Manipulation (1)

Purchasing of Company B's stocks continuously for half month



Mr. A

After investigation, it was found that Mr. A was an employee of Company B



Company B





#5 Market Manipulation (1)



Suspicious Activity Indicators

- Purchase price is higher than normal
- Transactions made few minutes before closing of market
- Transactions exceeded 50% of daily turnover and raised the stock price







#6 Market Manipulation (2)



Three separate clients of security firm X, they shared the same contact number and IP address

Frequent trading of Stock Y,
Three accounts placed similar
price and quantities







#6 Market Manipulation (2)

Suspicious Activity Indicators

- Purchase price is higher than normal
- Pattern of "High Buy but Low Sell"
 - Sources of fund were in doubt
- Shared contact number and IP address indicating their accounts were counted by the same gang





Common Typologies & Case Sharing (VATPs)



#7 VA in ML – Exploitation of OTC



Crime Proceeds originated from local and overseas scams



stooges to receive the proceeds from victims in stooge accounts



Syndicate purchased virtual assets at OTC

Syndicate then

withdrawn crime

proceeds in cash at ATMs

The virtual assets could be transferred to the wallets on VATPs



Common Typologies & Case Sharing (VATPs)



#8 VA in ML – Exploitation of VATPs



Crime Proceeds originated from local and overseas scams



Stooges receive proceeds in their bank accounts



Stooges exchanged the proceeds to crytocurrency on VATPs and made P2P transactions for layering



Syndicate eventually received the proceeds in their wallets on VATPs



Common Typologies & Case Sharing (VATPs)



#9 VA in ML – Using accounts and wallets of shell

companies



Crime Proceeds originated from local and overseas scams



Syndicate used the bank accounts of shell companies to receive crime proceeds



Syndicate opened crypto-wallets in name of the shell companies on VATPs and made fiat deposits using the crime proceeds



Syndicate eventually received the virtual assets in their wallets on VATPs

